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CASE COMMENTS
An objective test is used in cases where the issue is whether a true
indebtedness has been created or advances to the corporation were
contributions to capital. To determine that advances were contribu-
tions to capital, the opinion in United States v. Henderson,59 pointed
out that courts have looked for evidence of cash advances to commence
corporate life, repayment subordinated to other indebtedness, absence
of a fixed maturity date, agreement not to enforce collection, interest
paid only from earnings, and the right to vote in management of the
corporation by those making advances.6 0
However, the relation of a debt to taxpayer's trade or business does
not readily lend itself to any totally objective test because some flexibil-
ity must be allowed in order to examine the reason why taxpayer
created the indebtedness. Taxpayer's motivation cannot be evidenced
as can a debt in a debenture or indenture agreement, but must be deter-
mined at least in part by subjective evaluation.
The significant motivation test fulfills the criteria for a proximate
relation as set out in Whipple because it requires the taxpayer to prove
that the creation of the indebtedness was essential to preserving his
trade or business. The primary and dominant purpose test, however,
requires not only proof that the indebtedness was essential to taxpayer's
trade or business, but that whatever other considerations existed for its
creation were only incidental. To require proof that motivation other
than preservation of taxpayer's trade or business was incidental is to
require the taxpayer to show that he did not care as much about his
capital input as he did about his job. A shareholder-employee in a
close corporation is probably very much concerned with both. The
result is that the primary and dominant purpose test almost precludes a
business bad debt deduction for a shareholder-employee, while the
significant motivation test allows more flexibility.
JAMES W. JENNINGS, JR.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT
PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATIONS
The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have
the assistance of counsel in any criminal prosecution.1 In United States
v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a post-indictment line-up was a
r'375 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967).
OD375 F.2d at 40.
'The right to counsel at a criminal prosecution is set forth in the sixth
amendment as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
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"critical confrontation", such that the right to counsel became an in-
dispensable safeguard to protect an accused's right to a fair trial.2
Implicit in the Court's decision was the recognition that there are
serious dangers of misidentification inherent in eyewitness identifica-
tions.3 Although it has been suggested that the Wade rationale should
be construed so as to allow counsel at photographic identifications, 4
courts have hesitated to grasp the apparent analogy.5 It is therefore
significant that in United States v. Zeiler,6 the court invoked the
Wade rule so as to allow the assistance of counsel at a post-custody
photographic identification.
2United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967). Examples of critical stages
are the arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); certain preliminary
hearings, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); interrogation while the suspect
is in custody, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); the trial, Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and the appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). The Supreme Court defined "critical confrontation" or "critical stage" to
mean any point at which counsel's assistance is necessary to assure a meaningful
defense. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967).
In reference to the right to counsel at a pretrial line-up, the Supreme Court
stated:
It is central to that principle that in addition to counsel's presence
at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone
against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or in-
formal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate
from the accused's right to a fair trial. The security of that right
is as much the aim of the right to Counsel as it is of the other
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment-the right of the accused to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, his right to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and his right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him and to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The presence
of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself,
operates to assure that the accused's interests will be protected con-
sistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution. (Foot-
notes omitted).
388 U.S. at 226-27.
'388 U.S. 218 (1967). See generally P. WALL, EYE-WrrNESS IDENTIFCATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES (1965) (hereinafter referred to as WALL). For an interesting study
of cases in which convictions were erroneously arrived at because of misidentifica-
tions, see E. BORCHARD, CONVIGTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
'United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968). But see, e.g., United States
v. Ballard, 423 F.-2d 127 (5 th Cir. 1970); Rech v. United States, 41o F.2d 1131 (1oth
Cir. 1969); United States v. Bennett, 4o9 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Robinson, 406 F.2d 64 (7 th Cir. 1969); McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434 (0th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 9oS (1969).
'Courts have consistently held until recently that there was no right to counsel
at a photographic identification. See cases cited note 4 supra. Very recently, courts
have held, however, that there is a right to counsel at a photographic indentifica-
tion. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3 d Cir. 1970); Thompson v. State, - Nev.
-, 451 P.2d 704 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969); Commonwealth v. Whiting,
439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970).
6427 F.2d 13o5 (3d Cir. 197o).
CASE COMMENTS
In Zeiler, the Pittsburgh area had been plagued for several years by
a series of bank robberies, all thought to have been the work of the
"Commuter Bandit".7 For sometime after Zeiler's arrest, newspapers
and television stations showed pictures of the composite sketches of
the "Commuter Bandit", comparing them with photographs of Zeiler.
Three days after Zeiler's arrest, counsel was appointed to defend him.
Such counsel represented Zeiler at a subsequently conducted line-up
involving about fifty witnesses. However, before the line-up, the
F.B.I. privately confronted each witness with a series of photographs,
and Zeiler contended that these confrontations violated his sixth
amendment rights, or, at the very least, rendered the witnesses in
question incompetent for the purposes of in-court identification.
Citing a noted authority, the court in Zeiler stated that the dangers
of suggestion in a photographic identification are perhaps even
stronger than the danger of suggestion inherent in a line-up.8 Further-
more, the court noted that the constitutional safeguards of Wade
could easily be circumvented if police could privately confront wit-
nesses with suggestive photographs prior to line-ups.9 At least one
judge has expressed a fear that the absence of the requirement of coun-
sel at photographic "confrontations" might encourage police to abuse
the identification process.10
A brief discussion of Wade is a prerequisite to understanding the
significance of Zeiler. In Wade, the accused was also indicted for bank
robbery.". After counsel had been appointed, a line-up was conducted
without notice to such counsel. Two bank employees identified Wade
at the line-up, and again in court. The defense attorney objected to
the in-court identifications as they were based on line-ups which vio-
lated the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel. The
Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, agreed that the sixth amend-
ment requires the presence of counsel at a line-up.12 The Court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case for a finding of whether the in-
court identifications had independent origins, in which case they
should be admissable in court regardless of the improperly conducted
line-up.' 3
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that "the
'Id. at i3o6.
Old. at 13o7. See WALL at 66-89.
9427 F.2d at 13o7.
"GUnited States v. Marson, 4o8 F.2d 644, 653 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
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Framers of the Bill of Rights envisaged a broader role for counsel than
under the practice then prevailing in England of merely advising his
client in 'matters of law,' and eschewing any responsibility for 'matters
of fact'."'14 Further, at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, organiz-
ed police forces did not exist.15 Years ago, the confrontations between
the defendant and the witnesses against him occurred at the trial it-
self.16 Today's criminal prosecution procedure entails confrontations
of an accused at pretrial proceedings, with the result that very often an
accused's fate is decided out of court.'7 With these present realities in
mind, the Court in Wade construed the sixth amendment so as to
allow "counsel's assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful
'defence' (sic) ."Is In concluding which principles would be guiding in
disposing of the issue respecting right to counsel, the Court stated that
in light of Powell v. Alabama,0 and the succeeding cases, 20 each pre-
trial confrontation of the accused must be scrutinized to determine
whether the presence of counsel is indispensable to assuring the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial at which the opposing witnesses may be
meaningfully cross-examined.2 ' The majority commented that they
should "analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's
rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel
to help avoid that prejudice." 2
2
Having decided that the right to counsel attaches at critical con-
frontations, the Court proceeded to consider whether a line-up is a
critical confrontation.23 The work of a noted authority received heavy
consideration as the Court remarked that great miscarriages of justice
often result from mistaken identifications. 24 Recognizing that improper
suggestion at pretrial identification procedures accounted for many
misidentifications, 25 the Court enumerated some of the dangers of sug-






"287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932), cited at 388 U.S. 225.
2°H1amilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
"388 U.S. at 227.
=Id.
"Id. at 227-37.
1388 U.S. at 224, 229-32, 234. See WALL at 41-65. See generally, E. BORCHARD,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 786a (3d Ed. 1940 ) .
Z3 88 U.S. at 228.
21Id. at 229-35.
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One extreme example of an improper suggestion in a line-up oc-
curred in a Canadian case.27 The defendant had been identified from
a line-up of six men, in which he was the only Oriental. In other cases,
witnesses had known all the participants in a line-up except for the
suspect,28 the other participants were vastly unlike the suspect in ap-
pearance,20 and only the suspect was required to wear distinctive
clothing similar to that worn by the criminal.3 0 In Gilbert v. Califor-
nia,31 prejudicial suggestion occurred since the witnesses viewed the
suspect while in the presence of other witnesses.3 2 The vice of sugges-
tion created in Stovall v. Denno33 was the presentation to the witness
of a single suspect who was handcuffed to a police officer. The impro-
per suggestion in Wade was that the witnesses saw Wade standing in
the hall immediately preceding the line-up.
34
As early as 1923 the English courts recognized that a photographic
identification presents an opportunity for police to unduly suggest
that a certain photograph is of the guilty party.35 In one case an Eng-
lish court termed as "indefensible" the use of a photographic display
where a suspect was in custody.36 However, no criticism was made of
the showing of photographs to a witness when an accused was un-
available for a line-up.37
In United States v. Simmons,33 which involved a pre-custody photo-
graphic identification, the Supreme Court held that each case must be
considered on its own facts in determining whether the pretrial photo-
graphic identification procedure was fairly conducted. However, before
considering the fairness question, the Court felt compelled to justify the
use of the photographic identification procedure. The foundation of
2Regina v. Armstrong, 29 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 141 (B.C. 1959), as cited in
WALL at 53.
21People v. James, 218 Cal. App. 2d 166, 170-71, 32 Cal. Rptr. 283, 286 (1963);
People v. Boney, 28 Ill. App. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1963).
mSee Fredericksen v. United States, 266 F.2d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1959); State v. Hill.
193 Kan. 512, 394 P.2d io6 (1964); People v. Seppi, 221 N.Y. 62, ii6 N.E. 793 (1917);
State v. Duggan, 215 Ore. 151, 333 P.2d 9o7 (1958).
3mSee generally People v. Crenshaw, 15 Ill. 2d 458, 46o, 155 N.E.2d 599, 602
(1959); Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 168 A.2d 51o (1961); State v. Ramirez, 76 N.M.
72, 412 P.2d 246 (1966); State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336, 137 S.E. 172 (1927);
Barrett v. State, 19o Tenn. 366, 229 S.W.2d 516 (195o).
81388 U.s. 263 (1967).
MId. at 270.
=388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967).
'4388 US. at 234.
3
1
Rex v. Goss, 17 Crim. App. R. 196, 197 (1923), cited in WALL at 69. See
Williams, Identification Parades, [1955] CRIM. L. RLv. (Eng.) 525, 530-31.
'1Rex v. Haslam, 19 Crim. App. R. 59, 6o (1925), cited in WALL. at 71.
3Tld.
m390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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this justification was that Simmons was not in custody and not available
for a line-up. 9 Perhaps without realizing it, the Court practically em-
braced the English view that photographic identifications are justified
where the suspect is unavailable for a line-up, and not justified where
the suspect is available. Only by implication did the Court adopt the
view that photographic identifications are not warranted where a sus-
pect is available to stand in a line-up. However, as the Court paralleled
the philosophy of the English courts4o in deciding that the procedure
was justified in Simmons, if the occasion had presented itself the Court
might have also applied the English rationale and held that where a
suspect is in custody a photographic identification would not be
justified.
Satisfied that the type of identification procedure used in Simmons
was permissable, the Court proceeded to give numerous examples of
the ways in which suggestiveness may arise at photographic identifica-
tion sessions. 41 Even absent any improper suggestion, there is an
immediate danger that a witness, who caught only a brief view of a
criminal, or saw him under poor visibility conditions, may make an
incorrect identification.42 However, if the police display pictures only
of the suspect,4 3 or present a group of pictures in which a suspect's
photograph recurs or is somehow emphasized, the danger of misidenti-
fication increases markedly.44 Suggestion may also occur whenever the
police indicate to a witness in any manner that a particular photo-
graph is that of the guilty party.45 To make matters worse, once the
initial misidentification occurs, a witness is likely to remember the
image of the photograph, making the results of a subsequent line-up
or in-court identification less reliable.
46
Having counsel at a photographic identification would serve the
same function as allowing counsel's presence at a line-up, since in
either, an attorney's presence might keep the police from suggesting in
some manner the guilt of a certain suspect.4 7 A lawyer might wish to
protest the use of a particular procedure before or during the identifica-
tion session, or he might care to save his observations for the trial so as
3Id. at 383.
4'See text accompanying note 36.





6Id. at 383-84. Note 79 infra.
'7United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 653 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
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to possibly taint an in-court identification.48 If counsel were at a photo-
graphic identification, he would know whether attacking an out-of-
court identification would prove fruitful, therefore allowing him to
minimize the risks of unnecessarily revealing to the jury that his
client's photographs appeared in a police mug-shot book. 49 A further
reason for allowing counsel's presence is that in the case of a line-up,
counsel could discover the fairness of the procedure, 50 while in a photo-
graphic identification, counsel cannot discern possible improprieties
simply by viewing the photographs used in the procedure. 51 Indeed,
if the police purposely use a suggestive procedure, they may resist coun-
sel's efforts to obtain the photographs used in the display. In fact,
counsel might not be able to see any photographs at all.52 Perhaps the
most valid reason for allowing counsel at a photographic identification
is that police might rely on that method alone for identifying a sus-
pect, a simple way to circumvent the rule in Wade and subject the
suspect to the very same danger of misidentification that Wade sought
to eliminate.5
3
On the other hand, there may be valid reasons for denying the right
to counsel at a photographic identification. At a line-up, witnesses are
typically brought to a police station. However, at a photographic
identification, the police often take the photographs to the witnesses,
who might be some distance from where the suspect is being held in
custody. It is readily apparent that if counsel is required at photo-
graphic identifications taking place some distance from the location of
the suspect, attorneys might find themselves spending long hours travel-
ing. The best example of the type of functional problems which would
arise if attorneys were privileged to be present at photographic identi-
fications would be a situation where a crime is committed in one state,
the witnesses are in another state, and the suspect is arrested and being
"For a discussion of what lawyers might do at extrajudicial identification
procedures, see Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 39o (1967).
"WALL at 67-68. Cf. United States v. Reed, 376 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1967); Barnes
v. United States, 365 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1966). But see Bever v. State, 4 Md. App. 436,
243 A.2d 6 34 (1968); State v. Tyler, 454 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 197o).
wCounsel may do so because it is common practice for the police to photograph
a line-up. Interview with Technician J. H. Jones, Washington Metropolitan Police
Department in Washington, D.C., October 2, 1970. See also United States v. Eustace,
423 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 197o).
mSee United States v. Marson, 4o8 F.2d 644, 653 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
rif the police do not preserve the photographic display, quite obviously counsel
will not be able to see the same photographs the witnesses saw.
1rThat this might indeed happen led the court in Zeiler to extend the Wade
rationale so as to allow counsel's presence at photographic identifications. See
United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 6 54 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, J., concurring
and dissenting).
1971]
18o WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
held in a third state. In Wade, the Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that allowing the right to counsel would complicate line-ups and
prolong the prosecutor's efforts to gather evidence.5 4 The Court sug-
gested that substitute counsel could be used to alleviate problems of
delay and inconvenience. 5
There is a further reason for not allowing counsel at a photographic
identification. While Zeiler is predicated upon the theory that photo-
graphic identifications are subject to the same dangers of suggestion as
are line-ups, in the vast majority of cases in which the right to counsel
issue has arisen, the distinctions between photographic and physical
line-ups have been emphasized more than the similarities.50 The major
distinction would appear to center on the fact that in the line-up, the
accused himself is confronted by the witnesses, while in a photographic
identification it is the witness who is confronted. In answer to the
obvious argument that this is a distinction without a difference, "con-
frontation", as used in Wade, refers to situations in which the suspect
himself is present.0 7 However, Zeiler seemed to apply the term "con-
frontation" to situations other than those involving a confrontation
of the accused, since the court spoke of the witnesses being "confronted"
by the prosecution with the photographs of the accused. 58 As further
indication of the validity of the distinction, in United States v. Bal-
lard,5 9 and numerous other recent decisions in which the courts have
refused to apply the Wade rationale in the same manner as Zeiler,60
great emphasis has been placed on the fact that Wade limited the right
to counsel to cases involving a "critical confrontation".
In United States v. Bennett,61 Judge Friendly explicitly rejected the
contention that the right to counsel be allowed at any out-of-court pro-
ceeding where the defendant himself is not present.62 He noted that
none of the classical analyses of the assistance to be given by counsel
even suggest that counsel be present at an interrogation of a witness
when the defendant is not present. Judge Friendly's argument em-
phasized that a photographic identification is not a confrontation of
the accused, and for that reason could not fall within the ambit of
Wade. The true purpose of the assistance of counsel, he pointed out, is
51388 U.S. at 237.
&Id.
OSee cases cited note 4 supra.
51388 U.S. at 227, 228.
W427 F.2d at i3o6, 13o7.
5423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 197o).
eOSee cases cited note 4 supra.
e'4o9 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969).
vld. at 899-goo.
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to prevent the defendant himself from falling into traps devised by
the prosecution.
Because of the inherent limitations of photography, in that it pre-
sents two dimensions rather than three, and a "frozen" image which is
often rather unlike the living subject, a photographic identification is
inferior to a line-up and the results are less reliable.63 Police officials
maintain that often a witness will be hesitant to identify the suspect's
photograph but will immediately pick out the suspect at a line-up
where his mannerisms can be more fully observed.64 To the extent that
a photographic identification is unlike a line-up, the same protection
should not be afforded to both.
Apart from the Zeiler court's possible oversight in construing Wade,
there are other bases on which the court might have reached the deci-
sion that the photographic identification was invalid. In Wade, the
Supreme Court indicated that the fact that counsel had not been
present at a pretrial line-up would be irrelevant if it could be shown
that an in-court identification by the witness was based on observing
the defendant independent of the line-up. 65 To determine whether
there is an independent basis for an in-court identification, the Court
considered the following to be critical: the prior opportunity to ob-
serve the alleged criminal; the existence of a discrepancy between any
pre-line-up description and the defendant's actual description; any
identification of another person prior to a line-up; the identification
of a defendant by picture before a line-up; failure to identify the de-
fendant on a prior occasion; and a lapse of time between the alleged
act and the line-up.66
It should be noted that in Zeiler there was much to suggest that
there could not have been independent bases for the in-court identifica-
tion. Apparently some fifty witnesses had observed the various rob-
beries perpetuated by the "Commuter Bandit", and it is not dear
whether any of them had an opportunity to closely observe the crimi-
nal. At any rate, none of the witnesses had longer than a few minutes
to observe him.0 7 The court noted that Zeiler's features were not the
kind a person might easily remember. The time lapse between the
crime and the identifications was such that it was unlikely that a wit-
ness would remember much of anything about the criminal. Further,
6 WALL at 70. See United States v. Marson, 4o8 F.2d 644, 654 (4th Cir. 1968)
(Winter, J., concurring and dissenting).
6 Interview with Technician J. H. Jones, Washington Metropolitan Police De-
partment, in Washington, D.C., October 2, 1970.
6588 U.S. at 240. Cf. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
ee388 U.S. at 241.
07427 F.2d at 1308.
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the fact that the line-up was conducted after the photographic identi-
fication cast doubt on the validity of the results of the line-up.6 8
In United States v. Ballard,69 however, the witnesses had an excep-
tionally long time to carefully observe the defendants.70 The time lapse
between the crime and the photographic identification was only three
weeks, as opposed to over three years for some of the wtinesses in
Zeiler.71 Also, in Ballard, the witnesses actually stated that they could
have identified the defendants at the trial without ever having seen the
photographs7 2
Ostensibly, the court in Zeiler could not have resolved its dilemma
without addressing itself to the right to counsel issue, since there were
no bases for the in-court identifications independent of the line-up of
photographs. In Ballard, however, the court did not have to resolve the
right-to-counsel issue because there apparently were independent bases
for the in-court identifications.
The most logical ground on which the Zeiler court could have
based its decision that the photographic identification procedure was
invalid is implicit in the Simmons decision. In Simmons, the Supreme
Court held that the photographic identification procedure was justi-
fied, since the criminal was unknown and at large, and a dangerous
felony had been committed.73 The use of the word "justified" dis-
tinctly implies that perhaps in another situation, a photographic identi-
fication would not be justified. In Zeiler, the suspect and the witnesses
were all available to participate in a line-up.7 4 There was no apparent
reason for the police to use an inferior identification method when a
line-up could have been just as conveniently used. The court could
have seized upon this perfect opportunity to adopt the English rule,
which allows photographic identifications only where line-ups cannot
possibly be had without great inconvenience.
75
Because it was conducted in the absence of counsel, an obvious con-
sequence of the Zeiler court's invalidation of the photographic identi-
fication is that the purpose of the sixth amendment is distorted.7 6 That
purpose was to allow the defendant the assistance of counsel whenever
necessary to prepare a meaningful defense.77 As Judge Friendly indi-
68WALL at 84. Cf. United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152 (5 th Cir. 1976).
09423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970).
'"Id. at 132.
1427 F.2d at 13o8.
12423 F.2d at 129.
"39o US. at 384.
7'427 F.2d at 13o7, n.3.
"Cases cited note 35 supra; see WALL at 71.
"eSee note 21 supra.
1Id.
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cated in Bennett, any interview by the prosecution of a victim or wit-
ness affords just as much opportunity for undue suggestion as does a
photographic identification procedure.78 To extend the right to counsel
to photographic identifications would pave the way for a similar ex-
tension of the right to all situations involving the prosecution's at-
tempts to gather evidence, a result which would hopelessly complicate
our already overburdened criminal justice system.
The real danger of the Zeiler court basing its decision on Wade
rather than on the implicit suggestion in Simmons is that even though
a defendant's attorney is present at a photographic identification pro-
cedure, prejudicial suggestion may still occur. Having seen a photo-
graph, a witness might base a subsequent line-up or in-court identifica-
tion on his memory of the photograph and not of the actual criminal.7 9
Thus, no matter how fairly a photographic identification may be con-
ducted, the very procedure itself is inherently suggestive, and should
be used only when warranted by society's paramount interest in ap-
prehending unknown criminals.8
0
It would appear that the court in Zeiler erred in construing Wade
to allow the right to counsel at a photographic identification. There
is no logical way to avoid the fact that the Wade rationale applies only
to confrontations of the accused himself. Although the decision
reached in Zeiler was correct, it should have been based either on the
Simmons rule in that the procedure used was unduly suggestive,8' or
more logically, on the fact that since the defendant was in custody, the
proper method of identification was the line-up and not a photographic
identification.
THOMAS HARNEY McLACHLEN
8408 F.2d at goo.
nSir Richard Muir, a great English prosecutor, expressed this view, believing
that "however honest a witness might be, he could not shut out from his mind
the features of the man he had seen in the photograph." FmsrEAD, Sm RICHARD
MUIR 312 (1927), cited in WALL at 68.
"That society has a paramount interest in apprehending dangerous criminals
is apparent in the defense of the use of photographs for identification purposes
found in Simmons. See 39o U.S. at 377.
siThe rule is that the photographic procedure will be examined for fairness,
and where there is such suggestion as might lead to irreparable misidentification,
the photographic identification cannot be allowed to stand. 390 U.S. at 384.
In Zeiler, the court could have invalidated the photographic identifications for
violating the Simmons rule. The witnesses were confronted with eight photographs.
three being of Zeiler. This repetition alone was highly suggestive. Also, the five other
photographs were mugshots, while Zeiler's pictures were ordinary snapshots, which
again was suggestive in that the witnesses knew that Zeiler had been recently
apprehended. The most suggestive flaw in the procedure, however, was the fact that
while the actual robber was known to have worn glasses, only Zeiler was pictured
in the display as wearing glasses. 427 F.2d at i3o8.
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